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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah ·
~iiLAN

BOSKOVICH and FRIEDA
M. BOSKOVICH,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

lv1IDVALE CITY CORPORATION,
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
JORDAN SCHOOL DISTRICT, and
F. A. ORTON, REX ]. TRIPP,
ORLON NEWBOLD, WENDELL
VAWDREY and DR. ]. 0. JONES,.
as members of said Board of Education,
Defendants an~ Respondents.

Case No. 7756

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT. OF FACTS
This case was submitted to the District Court and. is here
on appeal on an agreed Statement of Facts, which is contained
in the record on appeal, and which has been stated in the ap..
pellants' brief. Accordingly, there are no issues of fact.
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ANSWERS TO POINTS
··sTATED IN BEHAL-F <)F APPELLANTS
. I. .
THE UTAH STATUTE CHAPTER 5 OF TITLE 78
PROVIDES THE ONLY M-ETH-OD~ FOR ABANDONMENT
OF A RIGHT OF WAY CREATED AS PART OF A SUB.
DIVISION.
II.
THAT THE MIDVALE CITY CORPORATION WAS
WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO ABANDON OR VACATE
THE PORTION O·F THE JORDAN AVENUE AND ALLEY.
We wish to here direct the attention of the court to the
fact, as shown by the statement of fact and the plat prepared
by Caldwell, Richards and Sorenson, that the part of a street
and alley which has bee~ vacated by Midv~le City does not
directly abut upon the property of the appellants' and the
further fact that appellants have all of the frontage upon
Jordan Avenue w~ich they. had prior to the passage of the
·ordinance of ·abandonment, and that their· most convenient
and most generally used means of access to the principal sys·
tern of· streets in Midvale City remains unimpaired. It is contended by the appellants that Midvale .City was without author·
ity to abandon or vacate that portion of Jordan_- Avenue and
an unnamed alley which is -shown to have been vacated, by
reason· of the fact that the provisions of Chapter 5 of Title
78, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, provide the only method for
abandonment of a right of way created as a part of a sub4.
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division. This contention is not supported by the languag~
or cor:text of the statute itself, by the force of the appellants'
argument, or by the cases and authorities cited in appellants'
brief.
Section 78-5-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1943,_ provides "that
any ou,ner of land that has been laid out and platted, as hereinbefore provided, 1nay upon application to the governing bo~y
of the city or tou·n, or to the board of county commissioners· of
any county, wherein said land is situated, have sueh plat, or
-any portion thereof, or any street or alley therein contained,
vacated, altered, or changed as hereinafter provided.,· (Emphasis ours.)
Section 78-5-7 and Section 78-5-8 are as follows:
"78-5-7. Id. Petition for.

If it is desired to vacate a portion only, or the entire
plat, application in writing, signed by all the owners
of the land contained in the entire plat and the owners
of the land contigu_ous or adjacent to any street or
alley therein to vacate or alter which application is
made, shall be made to the governing body of the city
or town wherein such land is situated, if the land is
situated in an incorporated city or town; in all other
cases the application shall be made to the board of
commissioners of the county wherein it is situated.,
(Emphasis ours.)
''78-5-8. Id. Order of.

The city or town governing body or board of county
commissioners shall at its next regular meeting after
the filing of such application consider the same, and,
if satisfied that neither the public" nor any person will
be materially injured thereby, it shall order such por-

5
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tion or the entire plat to be vacated as pra~ed ·for in
the petition, which order shall be record~d tn the office of the recorder of the county wheretn $uch land
is situated." (Emphasis ours.)
It is earnestly contended by app~llants that these pro·
visions of law are exclusive and mandatory and provide the
only means by which streets c·reated as a part of a subdivision
may be abandoned. A search of the language of these sections
fails to disclose any word, phrase or o~her indication that
they were so intended by the legislature. On the contrary,
the language of these sections is clearly permissive and pro·
vides a means by which abandonment of streets created as
a part of a subdivision may be initiated by the owners of property in the subdivision rather than by legislative action of the
governing body having jurisdiction over the property in question. It is clearly shown and can be freely admitted here that
the provisions of Chapter 5, Title 78, were not complied with.
There is nothing in the quoted sections to indicate that the
intent thereof is to set up a procedure for cities, towns, counties
or other municipal governments to follow.
There are instances in our law where interested persons
are permitted to institute· proceedings requiring only legal
sanction by designated authorities to achieve an ultimate result
which would be the same as though the proceedings had been
instituted by the governmental agency itslf. As an example
of this, we cite Sections 78-5-l to 78-5-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, inclusive. These sections provide a means by which
owners of property may, if they so desire, lay out and plat
such property into blocks, lots, streets, alleys and public places,

6
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submit the plat prepared and certified as in the statute provided,
to the proper governing body, and upon approval, record the
same in the, office of the Recorder of the county wherein the
property is situated. Section 78-5-4 provides as follows:
~(78- 5-4.

I d. Operate as Dedication of Streets, etc.

Such maps and plats, when made, acknowledged,
filed and recorded, shall operate as a dedication of all
such streets, alleys and other public places, and shall
vest the fee of such parcels of land as are therein expressed, named or intended for public uses in such
county, city or town for the public for the uses therein
named or intended.''
The reasoning of the appellants would lead to the conclusion that the legislation permitting owners of property to
plat the same into streets and other public places acts as a limitation upon the authority of cities and towns to lay out and
establish streets.
Another example is contained in the provisions of Section
25-10-21 to 25-10-25, both inclusive, Utah. Code Annotated,
1943, which provide that the voters of a city or town may
initiate legislation. The reasoning of the appellants would
lead to the conclusion that the provisions for dir~ct legislation
constitute a limitation upon the legislative authority of the
governing body of a city or town. This conclusion is, of course,
not warranted jn the examples cited, and by the same token is
not warranted in the instant case.
The authority of cities 'relative to streets is set out clearly
and without ambiguity in Section 15-8-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, which provides as .follows:
7
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15-8-8. Streets, Parks, Airports.
:·
-They may lay out, establish, ope~, al~er, wtden, nar(I

row, extend, grade, pave or otherwtse tmprove ~treets,
alleys, avenues, boulevards, sidewalks, parks, atrports
and public grounds, and rnay vacate the same or parts
thereof by ordinance."
There is no conflict betvveen the provisions of this section and those of Chapter 5, -Title 78. · Section 15-8-8 is contained in the chapter and title relating to cities and towns and
definitely prescribes their powers, duties and limitations. The
po\ver is given to lay out, ·establish, ope~, alter, etc., streets,
alleys, avenues, boulevards and to lCvacate the same or parts
thereof by ~rdinance." It would seem that if the legislature
had intended any limitation upon this power, it would be clearly
stated. It is not contended by the appellants that the street
and alley \vhich ·are the subject of this case are not streets
and alleys within the meaning of the sections quoted. On the
contrary, it is admitted, as a fact, that we are here dealirig with
a public street and a public alley. Title 78 deals entirely with
real estate and with the rights, powers and obligations of
individual persons with respect to real. estate. Chapter 5 of
Title 78, according to its language and context, deals only with
the general subject of the chapter, which is methods by which
individuals may deal with real estate. Certainly it would be
taking Chapter 5 of Title 78 entirely out of context to construe it as a limitation upon the powers of cities and towns.
The rules of statutory construction cited in appellants' brief
support the respondents' position herein.
It is contended also by the appellants that the creation
of a street by an individual places the street in a different cate·
8
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gory than those referred to in Section 15-8-8. We believe that
no such distinction exists. Section 78-5-3 provides that a person
desiring to subdivide property shall prepare a plat and that
the plat shall be approved by the governing body of the city
or to\vn \vherein the property is located. Section 78-5-4
provides that such plat, \vhen so accepted and recorded nshall
vest the fee of such parcels of land * * * in such * * * city
or town for the public uses therein named or intended." In
the present case, the street and alley in question were platted
as a part of a subdivision and became streets by reason of the
dedication as such by the owners of the underlying property
and by reason of the acceptance by Midvale City on behalf
of the public. It is conceded that streets may be laid out, established and created in cities by other means-for example,
many of our streets have been acquired by a direct conveyance
of property for street purposes, by condemnation for street
purposes or simply by use over a long period· of time for such
purposes. In each of these cases, the property interest in the
street is _acquired by the governing body on behalf of the
public, and its use is expressly limited to the purpose for which
it is created. No- differentiation is made as to the rights,
duties and liabilities of the governing body with respect to
streets acquired by dedication as a part of a subdivision or by
some other means. All such streets are treated the same in
law and in fact insofar as the city's rights and obligations to
maintain the same, to improve the· same and assess the cost
of improvements to the butting property' owners; to prevent
obstructions and nuisances thereupon and to exercise general
governmental control thereover are concerned.

9
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We have many instances in our state where property
\Vas deeded to the Mayor of a townsite for the purpose of plat·
ting and subdividing the same into lots, blocks, and streets
and selling the lots so platted to individuals. We can see no
distinction between a situation where the Mayor of a townsite
acquires the legal title to a parcel of land, plats it, sells lots
to individuals and dedicates portions of such property to the
use of the public, as represented by the municipal government,
for streets and other public purposes, and the situation here
where Russon Investment Company acquires a tract of land,
- plats it into lots, blocks and streets, dedicates the portion
designated for streets to the public, as represented by the
municipal government, and sells the lots to individuals. Re·
gardless of how a street or public area is created or dedicated,
the rights of the public are exactly the same, and these rights
are represented by the governing body having jurisdiction over
the area. These rights, including the. authority to vacate
streets and the manner in which this authority is to be exercised,
as clearly and concisely set forth in Section 15-8-8, supra.
In the case of Tooele City .v. Elkington, 100 Ut., 485;
116 Pac. (2d), 406, cited in appellantst brief, the situation was
the converse of that here presented. In that case, _property
had been platted by the Mayor into lots-, blocks and streets,
and lots had been sold to the defendant's predecessors in interest
abutting a platted right of way designated as an alley. Within
a relatively short time prior to the commencement of the
action, Tooele City had made a quit claim deed for a norninal
consideration conveying to the defendant all of the right, title
and interest of the city in and to the alley abutting the defend·
ant's property. In the action the city sought to set aside. the
10
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quit-claim deed and quiet title in the city to the property de·
scribed therein. The court held that the quit-claim deed was
not effective because the provisions of Section 15-8-8, Utah
Code Annotated, had not been complied with. In maki-ng a
rather exhaustive comment on the provisions of Section 15-8-8,
the COurt pointS {)Ut that it is there provided. that Cities may
vacate streets by or_dinance, and that the giving of a quit~claim:
deed without an ordinance of abandonment does . not comply
'vith the provisions of that section. The question of estoppel
is also discussed, and the case of Wall vs. Salt Lake City, 50
Ut., 593; 168 Pac., 766, is cited. In the case of Wall v.· Salt
Lake City it was found by the court that Salt Lake· City had
abanqoned a part of the street by estoppel. Also cited in
Tooele City v. Elkington is the case of Houghton v. Barton,
49 Ut.,. 611; 165 Pac., 471, wherein it is also held that the
city ·had abandoned a part of a street by estoppel. In the case
of Tooele City v. Elkington, the Court hel~ that there was no
estoppel in pais against the city because the time element was
short and the consideration paid the city for a quit·chiim deed
was small. There is no support for the position taken by the
appellants in the case of Tooele City v. Elkington, and as
pointed out, it is distinguishable from the present case on
the facts. However, it is interesting to note that, ·contrary to
the contention of the appellants herein that the provisions
of Title 78, Chapter 5, Utah Code Annotated are mandatory
and exclusive, the court, in Tooele City v. Elkington,. points
out the two other methods by which streets may be abando~ed.
In the first place the court i11:dicates rather clearly that its ruling
would have been otherwise had the provisions of Section
15-8-8 been complied .with by the passage_ of an ordinance,
11
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and in the second place, it is pointed out that under different
circumstances the court would have held that the city had
abandoned the street by estoppel.
The case of !fail v. North Ogden City, 166 Pac. (2d),
221, is also a case where the city is seeking the right to open
a street and is resisted in its effort to do so by abutting property
owners who claim the area included within the street is their
individual property. In this case, the property had been
deeded to the Probate Judge under the provisions of the
Territorial Townsite Act, in trust, for the purpose of platting
the same into lots, blocks and streets (tfor the several use and
benefit of the occupants thereof according to their interests."
Later, the town of North Ogden was incorporated, and after
a lapse of some time, attempted to open a street over an area
which had been platted by the Probate-Judge for that purpose,
and which had been dedicated by the Probate Judge for the
use of the public. Meanwhile, before and after the incorporation of the town of North Ogden, the various owners of property abutting the property platted as a street, had occupied
"and used this property in connection with their own properties for residential purposes. It was held in this case that the
city had the right to open the street, notwithstanding the
objection of the abutting property owners, but on rehearing in
the case of Hall v. North Ogden City, 175 Pac. (2d), 703,
the court reversed its previous ruling and held that· under the
language pf the applicable statute, the abutting property owners had occupied the property platted as a street, and therefore were the beneficiaries of the trust. This points out still
a third manner in which a street can· be, and has been, abandon12
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ed without reference to the provisions of Title 78, Chapter 5,
Utah Code .Annotated, 1943.
The case of Sowadzki v. Salt Lake County; 36 Ut., 127;
104 Pac.. 117, is directly in point. There the owners of property in Salt Lake County had subdivided it and platted it into
lots and streets under the prov~sions of a statute which was
sitnilar, if not identical, to the provisions of Title 78, C~apter
5..A.fter the filing of the suvdivision, the street remained unopened and unimproved for many years, and Section 1116,
Compiled Laws.of Utah, 1907, provided that na road not use~
or worked for a period of five years ceases to be a highway."
In that case, against the contention that the street had been
abandoned, it was contended that the owners of property
in a subdivision had some private rights in streets created as
a part of a subdivision which distinguishe~ such streets a~ to
method of abandonment from streets created by -other means.
The court there held that the general statute relative to abandonment of streets applied to streets created as a part of a subdivision in precisely the same mann~r as those created by
other methods. The case of Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 41 Ut., 501,
126 Pac. 959, arose out of the same situation as the previous
case of Sowadzki v. Salt Lake County. At page 514 of 41
Utah, the court makes the following observation: ·
Nothing is better settled in this country than that
a public street or highway may be vacated against the
wish of the abutting owners, provided just compensation is made to such owners. When no private rights
exist in the highway sought to be vacated, such vacation may be made as a matter of course. (West Chicago,
etc. v. McMullen, 134 Ill. 178, 25 N. E. 676, 10 L.R~A.
'c
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215). If the owner's property may· b.e t~ken against

his will,. so may his easements constituting property
rights be destroyed if just compensation be made therefor. In order to be entitled to compensation in case
a public highway is vacated, the claimant must show
a special interest in the highway.n
It is noted that in the latter quotation, the court raises
the question of damages. It .is well settled by several cases in
the State of Utah that no damages can be awarded where the.
street to be abandoned does not abut the property of the claimant, unless the damage of the claimant is different, not in
degree but in kind, from that of the general public. A case
particularly in point and one which supports the position of
the respondents in this action, is Robinette v. Price, 74 Ut.,
512, 280 Pac~, 736. See also annotation at 49 A.L.R., 330,
and 93 A.L.R., 639.
The appellants cite numerous cases to the effect that where
cities are authorized by law to abandon streets and the method
of abandonment is prescribed by statute, the statutory method
so prescribed must be strictly complied with. This is fundamental in municipal law and we agree. Section 15-8-8 prescribes that streets. may be vacated by ordinance. As pointed
out in the case at Tooele City v. Elkington, supra, the attempt
to vacate a street by other means failed because the statute had
not been complied with. In the present case, there is no .contention that the ordinance vacating a street, a copy of which
appears in the record, does not constitute compliance with
the provisions of 15-8-8, but only that the vacation of the
street does not comply with the provisions of an entirely un14
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related statute. We respectfully submit, therefore, that the
cases cited do not substantiate the appellants' position.

III.
THAT THE STATUTE SECTION 15-8-8 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL IF APPLIED TO THE VACATING OF
A DEDICATED STREET AND ALLEY AS IN THIS CASE.
The appellants contend in their argument under point
number III of the appellants' brief, that purchasers of property
in a subdivision acquire property- interest in a street in contra;.
distinction to interests of owners of property abutting a street
created by other means. It is clearly pointed out in the cases
which have been cited, and particularly in the case of Sowadzki
v. Salt Lake County, supra, that whenever a street is created
by any means, the public acquires the title only to the surface
of the street fer the use of the public as a right of way. SubJect only to the rights which the public acquire, the owners
of property abutting the street retain the ownership of prop·erty to the center of the street. In this case, -the ordinance of
abandonment has no effect upon the private property rights
of any individual. The only rights-which have been abandoned
are the rights of the ·public to the use of the area in question
as a public street. If the appellants have any private property
rights in the area of the street, then those rights have not been
impaired but have rather been enlarged by the abandonment
of the public rights in -the same area. There is nothing in
the statement of facts. to show whether or not the appellants
have such private rights, and of course these rights, if they

15
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do exist, could not be properly litigated in this action. The
appellants, as private property owners, are here merely contesting the right of the public, as represented by its governing
body, to abandon and vacate the rights of the public in and
to a particular area. If Mr. and Mrs. Boskovich acquired
rights in the property underlying the alley and Jordan Avenue
by reason of the fact that they owned property abutting the
part of Jordan Avenue which has not be.en vacated, then those
rights still exist. Nothing has been taken from them as private
property owners by the passage of the ordinance of abandonment and no private property rights could be taken from
them by any ordinance passed by Midvale City. The question
as to the ownership of the fee title to the property underlying
the street which has been vacated is not here before the court,
and has no place in this controversy. The law on this question
is contained in statutes and cases relative to creation and existence _of private property rights, and has no bearing upon
the powers of cities and towns, as representatives of the public. The case of Coop v. George A. Lowe Co., 263 Pac. 485,
71 Ut. 145, _cited in appellants' brief, is clearly distinguishable
from the case here at hand in that the public or private character
of the alley there under consideration and the rights of the
public thereto are not in question.

IV
THAT . THE BOARD OF EDUC·ATION HAS NO
RIGHT TO ERECT A FENCE ACROSS THE SAID JEF·
FERSON STREET AND ALLEY.
16
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v
THAT THE JUDGMENT IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
In the second paragraph of the appellants' argument
under points IV and V, it is stated that "any attempt on their
part to cross off the same would constitute a breach of plaintiffs' rights as abutting property owners and as members of
the public." The appellants, in seeking to appear in this
court as owners of abutting property and as members of the
public, place themselves in entirely opposite positions. They
appear before this court as the O\vners of property abu!ting
the street in which the public's rights have been abandoned,
and have stated that their private property rights are such that
the public is barred from abandoning its rights. As members
of the public, the appellants have no justifiable complaint.
In the authorities heretofore cited in this brief, to-wit: Tuttle
v-. Sowadzki; Robinette v. Price, ·49 A.L.R., 330 and 93 A.L.R.
639, it is clearly pointed out that a person whose porperty
abuts a street has no recourse in the eve.nt of the abandonment
of such street, unless his damage is different, not in degree but
in kind, from that of the general public. _ The statement of
the appellants that their normal access to and from their
property is seriously hampered by the abandonment of these
streets is not true and is not in accordance with the statement
of facts. They are left with -all of the frontage and their
best and most generally used means of access to their property
unimpaired and, as hereinbefore pointed out, _their private property rights remain precisely the· same as those which they held
prior to the passage of the ordinance of abandonment except
that those property rights, if any exist, are not now encumbered

17
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

by the interests of the public. If they have been injured by this
abandonment, it is only as members of the public and as
shown by the authorities above quoted, the fact, if it be a
fact, that their injury as members of the ·public is different
in degree than those of the general public, makes no difference
and is not actionable .. Their remedy as members of the public
lies primarily at the polls.
It is mentioned in the ·appellants' brief that they claim
injury because of the fact that upon abandonment, the property occupied by the street prior to abandonment becomes
the property of Jordan School District. This is, of course,
correct, and clearly gives the school district, as the owner of
the property abuting the portion of the street and alley abandon..ed, the right of enclose the property with a fence and to occupy
it as the owner thereof. This effect is not, however, created
by the fact that Midvale City has abandoned the street. It
is created, on the other hand, by the fact that these property
rights are now and have always been in existence, and have
been transferr~d to succesive owners of the abutting property
up to the present time. If the street directly abutting the
appellants' property were vacated, they would be entitl~d
~o. exactly the same rights in the property underlying the street.
No property rights are created or extinguished by the abandonment of the streets in question, except the rights of the pu~lic.
We urge and contend that we have controverted all of
the points raised in the appellants' brief, and all of the arguments in support thereof. We further contend that we have
shown that the authorities and statutes cited by the appellants
do not support their contention, and that the contention of
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the appellants is contrary to the law of this state, as shown
by the additional authorities cited herein. Accordingly, we
respectfully pray that the judgment of the District Court in
this case be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
BEN G. BAGLEY and
GRANT MACFARLANE,
Attorneys for Defendants and
Respondents
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